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Case No. 20110495-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Jeremy D. Penick,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for attempted murder. This Court has
jurisdiction under the pour-over provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j)
(West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress evidence
obtained following an allegedly unlawful arrest?
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law" reviewed for correctness. State v.
Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV (reproduced in Addendum A).
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' STATEMENT OF THE CASE

,-;

A, Summary of the facts.
The offense. On December 19,2009, Joseph Magack, a taxi driver, received a
dispatch directing him to pick up passengers at the Motel 6 at 176 East 600 South in
Salt Lake City. R210:32-33. When he arrived, Defendant and a tall, thin white man,
later identified as Joseph Ramsey, were waiting outside the motel office. R210:34-35.
Ramsey took the seat directly behind Magack. R210:36. Defendant attempted to sit
next to the driver in the front passenger seat. R210:35-36. Because some things were
on the seat, he sat down in the back seat on Ramsey's right side, R210:35-37.
When Magack asked where the men wanted to go, one said to the Fairway
Apartments and the other said to the Park Place Apartments. R210:37. When
Magack said he knew the location of the Park Place Apartments, they told him to
take them there. Id. Although the men had been talking to each other, they stopped
talking and were very quiet during the trip. R210:37-38. Magack said there was a
lot of fog that night. R210:38. One of them responded, "[T]his night is going to be
crazy/7 Id.
When Magack reached the front gate of the apartment complex, the men told
him to drive inside. R210:39. After Magack drove them 60 meters inside the
complex, he asked," [H]ere?" Id. They hesitated for a long time and then told him
2
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to drive further in. Id. At the end of the driveway, Magack turned right and again
asked them if this was the destination. R210:40. They again hesitated, but finally
said they were going to get out. Id. Magack pushed a button to unlock the door,
and they slid the door open. R210:41. They then told Magack to drive into a
parking stall, and he pulled into a parking stall with the taxi's sliding door still
open. R210:44.
As soon as Magack put the taxi in park, the white man grabbed Magack's
neck with his left arm, restrained Magack with that arm, and used a knife in his
right hand to stab Magack. R210:46-47,71. Defendant also stabbed Magack —once
in his shoulder and twice in his side. R210:48, 71.
Magack tried to defend himself and get out of the taxi. R210:49. He tried to
push back and punch Defendant to stop the stabbing. Id. Both men were "punching
and pushing" Magack as he tried to get out of his seatbelt and flee the taxi. R210:4950. As Magack tried to slide his arm and leg out the driver's side door, Ramsey
continued to hold his neck. R210:51. Defendant grabbed Magack's right arm with
his two hands, trying to restrain him. Id.
The attack lasted 15 to 20 seconds. R210:52. Magack sustained more than
nine stab wounds. R210:52. Magack, a fourth degree black belt in his native Sudan,
finally unlatched his seat belt and broke free. R210:47,52-53. After Magack escaped
the taxi, Defendant and Ramsey headed east, running as fast as they could. R210:54.
3
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Magack called the police, and an ambulance transported him to the hospital.
R210:57.
Facts relevant to arrest. Police and emergency personnel responded to the
call, and Magack told them about the attack. R210:82-83. Detective Derek Coats
was assigned to investigate the case.

R211:15-16.

He was initially given

descriptions of the two males who had attacked Magack. R211:16. He was also told
that officers went to the Motel 6 on the night of the crime, and motel staff provided a
surveillance videotape of the events at the motel just before Magack arrived.
R211:17-18. The motel clerk, who had called the taxi, told police that the call was
made at the request of two men who had come to the office window. R211:19. The
clerk identified the two men in the video as the two men who requested the taxi.
R211:18-19.
Detective Coats also made still shots from the video; prepared an information
bulletin; and delivered copies of the still shots, the video, and the bulletin to the
police public information unit for dissemination to the media and other members of
the public. R211:20; see also State's Exhibit 13 (a colored photo that was one of the
still shots distributed to the press) (included in Addendum B) (also reproduced in
black and white at R121). At about this time, Detective Coats received a phone call
from an unidentified female. R211:20-21. She said "that she knew of two males that
were talking about attacking a taxi cab driver and then provided a name and
4
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description/' R211:21. The caller also told Detective Coats that the people involved
with the taxi attack were located at the Volunteers of America Shelter (VOA) for
Youth. R211:22.
Based on this specific information, Detective Coats and his squad went to the
VOA shelter to look for the two men recorded on the Motel 6 video. R211:23. As
they walked in, Detective Coats saw a black male who looked like the black male in
the video. R211:23. The black male was wearing the same pants that the suspect in
the video had worn. R211:74-75. At trial, Detective Coats identified the black male
as Defendant. Id. As Detective Coats walked in, Defendant looked at him and then
immediately averted his eyes. R211:24. Defendant then approached the detective,
locked eyes with him, and asked why he was there and if he "was going to help
with donations for the VOA and what [he was] investigating/' R211:24. Detective
Coats asked one of the other officers to watch Defendant, spoke to the shelter
director, and then took Defendant into custody. R211:26.
During an interview at the police station, Defendant made a number of
statements. He identified himself in the still shot of the Motel 6 lobby, but said the
photo had been taken a week earlier, rather than a couple of days before when the
incident occurred. R211:29-30. He said he had called the taxi for someone named
Josh, but that they then "went their separate ways/7 R211:31.

5
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In a second interview immediately following the first, Defendant said that he
had been at the Motel 6 and also admitted that he called for a taxi about the time the
crime occurred. R211:36. But he asserted that he did not remember the name of the
other man. R211:36-37. Defendant finally offered that the man's street name was
"Rabbit" R211:37. Defendant admitted that he had called for the taxi, but claimed
that he went his separate way as the other man got into the taxi. See R211:36-37.
Detective Coats later confirmed with the other man, Joseph Ramsey, that his street
name was Rabbit. R211:37.
A short while later, Defendant offered a third version of what happened that
night. R211:38. He claimed he met Rabbit at the VOA, they went to the Motel 6,
and Defendant called for the taxi. R211:36-39. This time Defendant admitted that he
got into the taxi with the white male. Id. Defendant said they went to an apartment
complex near the library and, as they were getting out of the taxi, the white male
suddenly attacked the driver. R211:40. Defendant said that he tried to pull the
white male off the driver, but conceded that "it would have looked like he
[Defendant] was an attacker." R211:41. Defendant also conceded that although he
knew Magack had been stabbed, he did not call an ambulance or otherwise attempt
to help Magack. R211-.155-57.

6
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B. Proceedings below.
Defendant was charged with attempted murder and aggravated robbery.
R7-9. Defendant did not move to suppress any evidence. See Pleadings File; see also
Br. Appellant at 2. A jury found him guilty of both crimes. R161-62.
Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment, arguing that the evidence did
not support the guilty verdict on the aggravated robbery, because there was no
evidence that Defendant had the intent to deprive Magack of any property. R17177. The court granted Defendant's motion and dismissed the robbery count. R19899. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of three years to life on his conviction
for attempted murder. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to
suppress Defendant's statements to police following his arrest. Defendant asserts
that the arrest was unlawful, that he would therefore have prevailed on a motion to
suppress, that counsel performed deficiently for not moving to suppress, and that
Defendant suffered prejudice as a result.
Because Defendant has not demonstrated that the arrest was unlawful, he
cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance claim. Defendant cobbles together a few
points of testimony introduced at trial and suggests that that testimony is
insufficient to show probable cause. But the testimony to which he points does not
7
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demonstrate that the police lacked probable cause. On the contrary, that testimony,
together with other trial testimony that Defendant ignores, demonstrates that police
did, in fact, have probable cause. More significantly, the trial testimony does not
provide an adequate record to demonstrate that probable cause was lacking, that the
arrest was illegal, that counsel performed deficiently, or that Defendant suffered
prejudice. No one asked the officer what he knew when he arrested Defendant. The
prosecution asked him about factual matters necessary to show guilt, not probable
cause, and defense counsel cross-examined regarding those matters.
As a result, Defendant has not met his burden to present an adequate record
to prove his claim. Rather, this Court must construe all ambiguities and deficiencies
in the record in favor or a finding that trial counsel was effective. Construing the
ambiguities and deficiencies as so required, this Court must find that Defendant has
not shown ineffective assistance.

8
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ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT HAS NOT MET HIS HEAVY BURDEN OF
PROVING THAT COUNSEL PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY OR
THAT ANY DEFICIENCY PREJUDICED HIM
Defendant claims on appeal that at the time he was arrested, the arresting
officer lacked probable cause to believe that Defendant was one of the two men who
committed the attack and that the arrest was therefore unlawful. See Br. Appellant
at 14-15. Defendant claims that consequently his trial counsel was ineffective for not
moving to suppress the statements Defendant made following the arrest. See id.
A. Background law—ineffective assistance.
To establish ineffective assistance, Defendant must prove that counsel's
performance was deficient—that is, it did not meet an objective standard of
reasonableness — by identifying specific acts or omissions he alleges did not result
from reasonable professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,68788, 690 (1984). Defendant must also prove that" there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." Id. at 694; see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,119,12 P.3d
92. "Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also
prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the
9
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excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice." Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,375 (1986).
In making a claim of ineffective assistance, Defendant also bears the burden of
assuring that "the record is adequate." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 16. As a result, "an
appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is
supported by all the relevant evidence of which [the] defendant is aware." Id. at ^
17. "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that
counsel performed effectively." Id.
With respect to the first Strickland prong, an appellate court "must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial
strategy/"

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted).

This standard is

appropriately deferential, recognizing the "variety of circumstances faced by
defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions regarding how to best
represent a criminal defendant." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1254 (Utah 1993)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This deference also recognizes that,
"[ujnlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings,
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knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing
counsel, and with the judge/7 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011).
Thus, any conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions defeats a claim
of deficient performance. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, | 7, 89 P.3d 162; State v.
Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, If 58,61 P.3d 291. Because he bears the burden, Defendant
must "persuadje] the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's
actions." Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Defendant must ultimately demonstrate that "counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The ultimate "question is whether an attorney's representation
amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, not whether it
deviated from best practices or most common custom." Id. at 788.
With respect to the second Strickland prong, Defendant must show that absent
counsel's acts or omissions, there is a reasonable probability that he would have
received a more favorable result below. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah
1998). A reasonable probability is a probability "sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome. It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding. Counsel's errors must be so serious as to deprive
11
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the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at
787-88 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Proof of prejudice must be
based on a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter." Chacon, 962 P.2d at
50. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. Background law —lawfulness of arrest.
"[T]he [United States] Constitution permits an officer to arrest a suspect
without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has
committed or is committing an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36
(1979). "'[Pjrobable cause' to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within
the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Id. at 37; see also State
v. Hansen, 2011 UT App 242, f 10, 262 P.3d 448 (quoting DeFillippo). "Whether
probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the
facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest." Devenpeck v. Alford, 543
U.S. 146,152 (2004); see also Hansen, 2011 UT App 242, f 10.
The probable cause requirement is intended "to safeguard citizens from rash
and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of
crime," and also "to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's
protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,176 (1949). The probable cause
12
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rule "is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has
been found for accommodating these often opposing interests/7 Id. Probable cause
"does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt
or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are
seldom crucial in deciding whether evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt/7
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,121 (1975). Probable cause requires merely that the
information available to the officer show "a fair probability" that a suspect has
committed a crime. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983) (discussing the probable
cause to believe that contraband would be found).
C

Defendant has not demonstrated that his trial counsel was
ineffective for not moving to suppress Defendant's statements
following his arrest
Defendant claims that police lacked probable cause to arrest him and

consequently that his post-arrest statements should hve been suppressed. Br.
Appellant at 15-30. Defendant, however, did not move below to suppress. See
Pleadings File; see also Br. Appellant at 2. Accordingly, he claims for the first time on
appeal that counsel was ineffective for not recognizing that the arrest was unlawful
and for not moving to suppress the statements Defendant made following the arrest.
See Br. Appellant at 15-30.
Where during pretrial proceedings a defendant moves to suppress statements
made after a warrantless arrest, the State bears the burden to prove that the arrest
13
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was lawful. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, H 40,164 P.3d 397 ("Once a valid
constitutional challenge is made, the burden shifts to the State to prove that its
warrantless action was justified/7). But where, as here, a defendant does not move
to suppress during pretrial proceedings, but instead claims on appeal that counsel
was ineffective for not moving to suppress, a defendant bears the burden to show
that counsel was ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690. Thus, a
defendant bears the burden to show that the arrest was unlawful, that counsel
performed deficiently for not recognizing that it was unlawful and for not moving
to suppress the defendant's post-arrest statements, and that the defendant was
prejudiced because counsel did not do so. Defendant has not met that burden.
1. Defendant has not demonstrated that the arrest was unlawful
and that counsel therefore performed deficiently for not
moving to suppress Defendant's post-arrest statements.
This Court cannot conclude, based on the record that Defendant has
presented, that his arrest was unlawful. The only record Defendant has presented
in support of his claim is the trial transcript. The trial transcript does not, by itself,
show that the arrest was unlawful. Moreover, Detective Coats relied on other
information not included in this record that must be construed in favor of a finding
that counsel's performance was professionally reasonable because counsel
recognized that the arrest was lawful.

14
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a. The trial testimony established facts supporting probable
cause to justify the warrantless arrest.
Defendant asserts that the following list contains all the facts that were at
Detective Coats' disposal when he made the arrest:
• The officer had a description that a 5'7" to 5'9" male black adult wearing a
blue jacket, grey pants and dark shoes, along with a white male, over 6' tall,
wearing a yellow hoodie with a jacket over that and pants[, was] involved in
the attack.
• Surveillance footage showed two males, one white and one black, call for a
taxi from the Motel 6.
• Mr. Magack [the taxi driver], after viewing a still image from the photo,
confirmed that the men in the photo were the two men who attacked him.
• The Motel 6 clerk confirmed that these two were the persons who called the
taxi.
• The officer circulated still photos to the media, which were run by KSL.
• An anonymous female tipster told the officer that the attacker might be at the
VOA Shelter for Youth, and she named a name.
• When the officer went to the VOA, he saw a black male 'which immediately
looked like the individual in the photograph.'
• This black male, the defendant, 'immediately averted his eyes' and looked
away from the officer. Then [the] defendant approached the officer, asked
why he was there, if he was helping with donations and what he was up to.
• The detective asked another officer to watch [the defendant], then went to
talk with management.
• Detective Coats talked with the director, returned, and then arrested
[Defendant].
Br. Appellant at 20-21 (citing Detective Derek Coats' trial testimony at R211:17-26).
Defendant asserts that this testimony shows only that Defendant "looked like
the suspect" shown in the video and that Defendant "averted his eyes when the
officer came in." Br. Appellant at 21. He claims that probable cause to arrest
requires much more. Id. But probable cause requires only that the facts and
15
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circumstances known to Detective Coats show a "fair probability" that Defendant
had committed a crime. The testimony to which Defendant points demonstrates
such "a fair probability."
The detective had viewed surveillance footage showing two suspects at the
Motel 6. R21117-18. The Motel 6 clerk had identified them as the men who called
the taxi. R211:19. The detective had circulated still photos of these suspects. Id.
Taxi driver Magack had identified the men in the still shot taken from the footage as
his attackers R211:18. An anonymous tipster had told Detective Coats that the
attacker might be at the VOA. R211:22. When the officer went to the VOA, he saw
Defendant who "immediately looked like the individual in the photograph."
R211:23. Magack's account of the attack given to police within hours of the incident,
R210:82-85, together with these facts, was sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution in Detective Coats' position in believing that Defendant was one
of the suspects who committed the attack against Magack, see DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at
37. These facts and circumstances showed "a fair probability" that Defendant had
committed the crime. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Thus, contrary to Defendant's
claim, the arrest was supported by probable cause.
Moreover, Defendant ignores other facts and circumstances in the record that
provide additional support for a finding of probable cause to arrest. The trial
transcript shows that Detective Coats also testified that when he entered the VOA
16
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shelter, Defendant first averted his eyes, but then approached, locked eyes with
[Detective Coats] and asked, without any earlier discussion of the matter, what the
detective was "investigating." R211:24. Where Defendant initiated the encounter,
asked without prompting about an investigation, and "locked eyes" with the
detective, his actions suggested a consciousness of guilt. Cf. State v. Godfrey, 1999 UT
App 53U, *1 (Godfrey's unusual response to police questions was suggestive of his
"consciousness of guilt"). In addition, Detective Coats testified that Defendant was
wearing the pants worn by the black suspect in the video when the detective arrived
attheVOA. SeeR211:74-75.
b. Defendant has not met his burden to present an adequate
record on whether the arrest was lawful.
Defendant also fails to include other evidence upon which Defendant Coats
relied in deciding to make an arrest. Here, Defendant is apparently claiming that
the pictures Detective Coats had seen of the suspect were insufficient to support the
detective's identification of Defendant as the suspect. As explained on the record,
Detective Coats concluded upon seeing Defendant at the VOA that Defendant
"looked immediately like the individual in the photograph." R211:23. But the
record Defendant has presented does not include all the evidence that may have
supported the Detective's identification of Defendant as the suspect in the picture,
and the resulting ambiguities and deficiencies resulting therefrom must be
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construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively. Litherland, 2000
UT76,Tfl7.

\

In claiming the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Defendant bears the
burden of assuring that "the record is adequate/' Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 16. As a
result, "an appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness
presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which [the] defendant is
aware." Id. at f 17. "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion,
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of
a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id.
The record on appeal in this case contains one of the photographs Defendant
Coats prepared for dissemination to police, see State's Exhibit 13, but Detective
Coats testified that he prepared a number of still shots of Defendant from the
surveillance video, R211:19-20. Thus, in making the identification of Defendant as
the black suspect in the photos, Detective Coats relied not only on State's Exhibit 13,
but also on the surveillance video itself and the other still shots made from it. See
R211:21. Defendant has not included either the video or the other photographs in
the record on appeal.
Detective Coats also testified that the anonymous female tipster gave him
both a name and an address where he could find the suspects in this case. R211:2122. The record Defendant has presented does not disclose what name the tipster
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gave the detective or whether Detective Coats asked her any questions to establish
the basis for and reliability of her tip. Moreover, Detective Coats testified that he
spoke to the VOA shelter director before arresting Defendant. R211:26. Where the
Detective testified that he "had a name" for the suspect, it seems likely that before
arresting Defendant/he asked the director what Defendant's name was. And the
director may have identified Defendant by the name the tipster gave to the
detective. But the record presented does not include any evidence on these matters.
As noted, counsel is presumed to have performed effectively. As explained,
this Court must therefore construe the resulting ambiguities and deficiencies in
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^f 17.
Absent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court must assume that trial counsel
"knew of materials outside the record" that would have clearly shown that
Detective Coats had probable cause to arrest Defendant and that counsel therefore
acted within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance" in not moving
to suppress. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788.
Here, the Court must therefore assume that, absent contrary evidence,
counsel's failure to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge was an exercise of sound
trial strategy based not only on his review of the evidence eventually introduced at
trial, but also on the surveillance video, the other still photographs, and the
identifying information provided by the female tipster and the VOA shelter
19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

director. In other words, this Court must assume that the surveillance tape and the
still photographs taken from it showed a suspect that looked just like Defendant.
This Court must assume that the anonymous tipster not only told Detective Coats
that he could find the cab driver's attacker at the VOA, but that she gave Detective
Coats Defendant's name. And, the Court must assume that the director at the VOA
shelter identified Defendant by that name.
In sum, any motion to suppress would have failed because probable cause
justified the arrest. Thus, Defendant's "trial counsel cannot be considered to be
ineffective for not making a futile motion." State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, f 57,
706 Utah Adv. Rep. 25.
2. Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice.
For the same reasons, Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. Defendant
has not demonstrated that Detective Coats lacked probable cause to arrest
Defendant. Defendant therefore has not shown that he suffered any prejudice. He
has not shown that, had trial counsel moved to suppress, the motion would have
been granted and that consequently there would have been "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Moreover, Defendant cannot show prejudice because the evidence against
him, even without his post-arrest statements, was overwhelming. The evidence
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included the surveillance video picturing him at the motel. It included Defendant
Coats' testimony that the motel clerk identified the black male in the photo as one of
the two men who asked her to call for a taxi shortly before Magack responded. And
the evidence would have included Magack's identification of Defendant as the male
who stabbed him and held his arm while the white male stabbed him from behind.
Moreover, while Defendant claime.4 that only Ramsay attacked Magack and that
Defendant "finally got Ramsey off Mr. Magack," R211:132, the record also contains
Magack's testimony that Defendant both restrained and stabbed him, R211:169-71,
and Defendant's concessions that "it would have looked like he [Defendant] was an
attacker" and that he did nothing to help Magack following the incident, R211:41,
155-57. In the face of this evidence, even if Defendant could show that the arrest
was unlawful and that trial counsel performed deficiently for not moving to
suppress his statements, he could not show prejudice.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted May _TL 2012.
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U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
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